Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 14

Number 1

Article 1

1-1-2007

Social Security and the Stock Market: Lessons from Around the
World
Alicia Haydock Munnell
Boston College

Steven A. Sass
Boston College

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research
Part of the Social Policy Commons

Citation
Munnell, Alicia H., and Steven A. Sass. 2007. "Social Security and the Stock Market: Lessons from Around
the World." Employment Research 14(1): [1]–3. https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.14(1)-1

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

JANUARY 2007

In this issue:
Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass

Social Security and the
Stock Market
u
Matthew Dey, Susan Houseman,
and Anne Polivka

Outsourcing to Staffing Services
u

New Books

Vol. 14, No. 1
Employment Research is published
quarterly by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. Issues appear in
January, April, July, and October.
The Institute is a nonprofit, independent
research organization devoted to finding and
promoting solutions to employment-related
problems at the international, national, state,
and local level. The Institute is an activity
of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee
Corporation, which was established in 1932
to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E.
Upjohn, founder of the Upjohn Company, to
conduct research on the causes and effects
of unemployment and seek measures for the
alleviation of the hardships suffered by the
unemployed.
W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
(269) 343-5541
www.upjohninstitute.org
Randall W. Eberts
Executive Director

ISSN 1075–8445

Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass

Social Security
and the Stock Market
Lessons from Around the World
This article is based on the authors’ book
Social Security and the Stock Market: How
the Pursuit of Market Magic Shapes the
System, which is available now from the
Upjohn Institute. See the form on the back
cover for details.

T

he U.S. retirement income system
faces major challenges as the transition
to a much older society begins. The
ratio of the elderly population (age 65 or
over) to working-age adults (ages 20–64)
will rise from 20 percent today to about
35 percent by 2030 (Figure 1). Social
Security, the backbone of the nation’s

Our book focuses on a
surprising point of consensus
in the contentious debate on
Social Security: a portion
of the funds that pass through
the program ought to
be invested in equities.
retirement income system, faces a longterm shortfall equal to 2.02 percent of
taxable payrolls when measured over
the traditional 75-year planning horizon
(Table 1). That deficit is significantly
larger if we also consider the years
beyond that horizon.
Compounding the challenge is the
fact that fewer employers sponsor
traditional defined-benefit pension
plans. This removes employer

investment management, risk-bearing,
and a significant amount of employer
contributions from the retirement income
system. In the now dominant 401(k)
plans, workers assume the investment
and mortality risks formerly borne by
their employers; so far they have not
accumulated the assets needed for a
secure retirement.
Our new book, Social Security and
the Stock Market: How the Pursuit
of Market Magic Shapes the System,
is a contribution to the debate over
how to restore financial balance to the
Social Security program. It focuses on
a surprising point of consensus in that
contentious debate: a portion of the funds
that pass through the program ought to
be invested in equities. Policymakers
from all political camps see investment
in equities, with the higher expected
returns they offer, as a way to minimize
tax increases or retirement income
cuts—the only other options for closing
the financing shortfall.
The 1994–1996 Social Security
Advisory Council proposed three main
approaches for using equities in the U.S.
Social Security program: 1) invest a
portion of trust fund assets in equities;
2) use add-on individual accounts, which
would top up the reduced benefits that
could be financed by the payroll tax; and
3) use carve-out individual accounts,
funded by redirecting a portion of
current payroll taxes in exchange for a
further reduction of guaranteed social
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Figure 1 U.S. Population Age 65+ as a Percentage of Population 20–64, 1950–2050
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Source: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006).

insurance benefits. But the council failed
to reach a consensus on which method to
recommend, and no action has since been
taken.
To help evaluate the nation’s options
going forward, our book explores the
experiences of three countries—the
United Kingdom, Australia, and
Canada—with retirement systems much
like that of the United States that have
introduced equities into their public
pension system in each of the three ways
proposed by the Advisory Council.
Lessons from the U.K. Experience
The United Kingdom reformed its
system along the lines of the Advisory
Council carve-out approach. It sharply
cut its two social insurance pension
programs, the Basic State Pension and the

State Earnings Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS), rather than schedule a sharp
increase in taxes. The Basic State Pension
fell from 25 percent of the average
earnings in 1980 to 15 percent today, and
is projected to be just 7 percent by the
middle of the twenty-first century. The
government even encouraged workers to
“contract out” of SERPS by redirecting
their payroll tax contributions to
individual retirement savings accounts.
One lesson from the British experience
is that individual accounts can result in
high administrative and regulatory costs,
along with significant mismanagement
and scandal. Most U.S. carve-out
proposals would improve on the British
design by using the government to
collect and administer accounts with
small balances. But the cost of selling,
administering, and regulating individual

Table 1 U.S. Social Security’s Financing Shortfall
Period
2006–2080
2006–Infinity
a

Present discounted
value (trillion $)

As a percent of
Taxable payrolls
GDP

4.9a
13.4

2.02
3.7

0.7
1.3

The $4.9 trillion includes $4.6 trillion, the difference between scheduled benefits and projected
revenues, and $343 billion required to bring the trust fund to 100 percent of annual cost by the
end of the period.

SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006).



accounts, even well above the “small
balance” threshold, is nevertheless high.
The most important lesson from the
U.K experience is that a broad take-up
of the individual account option, with a
resulting reduction in guaranteed benefits
below the socially acceptable level of
adequacy, could quickly lead to a major
expansion of means-testing. The British
elderly, on the whole, are now on the
road to becoming a welfare-dependent
population. To avoid this outcome, the
British government is considering major
reform of its retirement income system
that would abandon the carve-out design.
The goal of the U.K.’s carve-out
approach was to reduce dependence
on the state and increase reliance on
individual initiative and private financial
markets. However, retirement income
systems emerged throughout the
industrial world because people generally

The British elderly, on
the whole, are now on the road
to becoming a welfaredependent population. To
avoid this outcome, the British
government is considering
major reform of its retirement
income system that would
abandon the carve-out design.
proved themselves incapable of preparing
for their own old age. The British
experience suggests that this original
incapacity has not been overcome. Thus
the outcome of sharp social insurance
cutbacks and expanded privatization—in
the United States as in Britain—is
likely to be just the opposite of what its
proponents desire.
Lessons from the
Australian Experience
Australia reformed its retirement
income system along the lines of the
add-on individual account approach.
Like the add-on proposal of the
Social Security Advisory Council, the
Australian Superannuation Guarantee
program brought additional resources
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to the retirement income system.
Superannuation Guarantee contributions,
at 9 percent of earnings, are far larger
than add-on proposals in the United
States. But the preexisting Australian
public system was limited to the meanstested Age Pension and had no earningsrelated component.
Many Australians hoped that workers
would accumulate enough assets in their
Superannuation Guarantee accounts to
return the Age Pension to its original
safety net function. But Treasury projects
that 75 percent of the elderly will collect
Age Pension benefits even after the
Superannuation Guarantee program
matures, with even more collecting
benefits at some point in their lives,
and benefits for the average beneficiary
only slightly reduced. For this reason,
the Age Pension will remain the central
component of the Australian retirement
income system.
A key lesson for the United States
arises from the interaction between
Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee
individual account and its means-tested
Age Pension programs. The retirement
income generated by Superannuation
Guarantee accounts, invested in equities,
carries a good deal of risk. The risks are
essentially identical to those in individual
account employer plans, which are
becoming as dominant in Australia as
in the United States. The means-tested
Age Pension plays an important role in
offsetting a significant portion of this
risk. Age Pension benefits rise for those
who outlive their assets, invest poorly,
or are in unlucky cohorts when it comes
to investment returns. And it effectively
funds those higher benefits by reducing
benefits to those who do well or die
young.
But using the Age Pension means test
to dampen the risks of holding equities in
individual accounts has two dysfunctional
effects. The first is the overinvestment
in privileged assets, such as housing and
consumer durables, that yield higher
returns than alternative investments, such
as stocks and bonds, only after netting out
Age Pension reductions. Potentially far
more serious is the incentive, created by
the means test, for workers to retire early,
cut back on savings, and spend down
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their assets prior to reaching old age to
collect a higher Age Pension benefit.
Lessons from the Canadian Experience
Canada reformed its system along the
lines of the trust fund approach. It set up
the quasi-independent Canada Pension
Plan Investment Board to oversee the
investment of social insurance trust fund
assets in equities. It also introduced
a default mechanism that adjusts
contribution and benefit levels to restore
solvency over a 100-year period should
market fluctuations, or other causes, push
the plan out of balance.
The Canadian experience shows that
the cost of administering and regulating
equity investments through a centrally
managed trust fund is dramatically lower
than through a myriad of individual
accounts. Investment and mortality risks
are also pooled far more effectively, in
that the effect of market fluctuations

The major concern about
investing social insurance
trust fund assets in equities is
the power it potentially puts
in the hands of government.
and “excess” longevity on individual
workers and retirees is dramatically less.
This is especially important as workers
in Canada, just as in the United States,
are increasingly dependent on individual
account employer retirement plans. The
trust fund approach to pooling risk also
avoids the moral hazard inherent in
Australia’s means-tested approach.
The major concern about investing
social insurance trust fund assets in
equities is the power it potentially puts in
the hands of government. The Investment
Board is free to invest trust fund assets in
the full gamut of opportunities available
to managers of employer defined-benefit
pension plans. The Board could use this
freedom to advance “socially desirable”
purposes, which could undermine
retirement income security and open the
door to government interference in the
economy. To guard against such threats,
Canada adopted an elaborate process to

minimize political influence in selecting
the members of the Investment Board.
It also mandated an extensive reporting
process to make the workings of the
Investment Board as transparent and open
to public scrutiny as possible. Canadian
observers generally agree that the
Investment Board has thus far performed
its duties in a professional manner, free of
political influence.
Summary
The experience from these three
countries seems to clearly indicate that
a trust fund approach similar to the
Canadian system would be the least
problematic for the United States. The
political stakes in placing such a large
amount of wealth and corporate shares
in government hands would be high. But
the task of overseeing equity investments
in Social Security would be simplified,
and the likelihood of success significantly
enhanced, if equities were added to the
system through the trust fund approach.
The task of governing the investment of
the trust fund in a passive equity index
is clearly less complex than the daunting
challenge of overseeing and regulating
equity investments in a great number of
individual accounts.
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